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I.

Introduction

“Hospital and healthcare software security can always be
marginally improved, but if we want to lower the risk of healthcare
security breaches, we need to take a very different approach. Only
marginal improvements can be made by investing in more of the
same resources in the problem, and the [return on investment]
has diminishing marginal returns. A better approach is to
understand the root causes at the core of healthcare security
breaches.”

—Ron Avignone1
On February 5, 2016, Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in
Los Angeles, California, was held hostage when an anonymous hacker
infiltrated its information systems.2 The security breach shut down the
hospital’s entire information system—the computerized databases
storing all the hospital’s electronic information—sending the hospital
offline for more than a week.3 Doctors and other hospital employees
were unable to access any electronic documents, patient data, or even
e-mail.4 The cybercriminal had somehow pierced the security of the
Medical Center, and once inside was able to encrypt all of the files on
the Center’s information system.5 This resulted in the data being
“translated” into a different form, unreadable to anyone without a specific
password.6 Without that password, the hospital was locked out of
1.

Ron Avignone is founder of Giva, a California-based tech company that
centers around help desk applications. Ron Avignone, Ethical hacking a
vital necessity to fight against healthcare ransomware, MED. ECON. (April
27, 2016), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-econ
omics/news/ethical-hacking-vital-necessity-fight-against-healthcarerandsomeware.

2.

See Trevor Mogg, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 to Ransomware
Hackers, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.digitaltrends
.com/computing/hollywood-hospital-ransomware-attack/.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

What is Data Encryption?, DIGITAL GUARDIAN https://digitalguardian
.com/blog/what-data-encryption (last updated July 27, 2017) (explaining
that the process of encryption “translates” plaintext—readable data—into
ciphertext, which is almost entirely unreadable compared to its prior
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accessing any data on its system. Unfortunately for the hospital, a
restoration of access to its data had a price: $17,000 in the form of
bitcoin, a digital currency.7
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center eventually relented and
paid the $17,000 ransom.8 Allen Stefanek, the Chief Executive of the
Medical Center, explained that paying the sum demanded by the hacker
was “[t]he quickest and most efficient way to restore [its] systems and
administrative functions.”9 Although Stefanek attempted to downplay
the breach by announcing that no patient information or hospital
records were compromised,10 the fact still remains that an unknown
cybercriminal infiltrated the Medical Center’s cybersecurity and gained
access to the sensitive health information of its patients. Although the
hacker decided to encrypt the data files and demand a ransom, it could
also have decided to simply steal the information outright.11
Today, patients find themselves in a digital economy.12 Industries
have been swept into the current of the data-driven world and have
been forced to adapt accordingly to survive.13 Healthcare is no different.
The trend of patient-centered “on demand” services has pushed
healthcare providers into the digital age of integrating technology into
the practice of medicine, both in the solutions they offer patients and
the administration of healthcare organizations.14 Entrance into the
form). This process is described in greater detail in Part II, section C of
this Note.
7.

Danny Yadron, Los Angeles Hospital Paid $17,000 in Bitcoin to
Ransomware Hackers, The Guardian (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/technology/2016/feb/17/los-angeles-hospital-hackedransom-bitcoin-hollywood-presbyterian-medical-center.

8.

Id.

9.

Richard Winton, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 in Bitcoin to Hackers;
FBI Investigating, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.latime
s.com/business/technology/la-me-ln-hollywood-hospital-bitcoin20160217-story.html.

10.

Id.

11.

See, e.g., Chris Stobing, Ransomware is the New Hot Threat Everyone is
Talking About; What do You Need to Know?, DIGITAL TREND (June 6,
2015),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/what-is-ransomwareand-should-you-be-worried-about-it/ (“[Ransomware] offered a simple,
and reliable revenue stream that the underground market could capitalize
on to fund other, less-profitable operations.”).

12.

See Lindsey Anderson & Irving Wladawsky-Berger, The 4 Things It Takes
to Succeed in the Digital Economy, HARV. BUS.REV. (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/03/the-4-things-it-takes-to-succeed-in-the-digitaleconomy.

13.

Id.

14.

See Dennis Bonilla, Five Tips You Need to Ease Patient Concerns in the
Digital Age, MODERN HEALTHCARE http://www.modernhealthcare.com
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digital realm comes a host of cybernetic threats. Unlike many other
industries, however, healthcare providers control troves of highly
sensitive information, a fact of which their patients are hyperaware.15
As a result, healthcare providers have a target on their back.16 Ransomware is a new menace on the cyber-threat scene and has recently begun
targeting hospitals and other healthcare providers. And while
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center’s attack garnered a lot of
attention, it was not the first of its kind and certainly will not be the
last.
Early in February 2016, Methodist Hospital in Henderson,
Kentucky declared a “state of emergency” when a hacker prevented the
hospital from accessing patient files.17 The following month, MedStar
Health—a health system that operates ten hospitals and over 250 outpatient facilities—was attacked and forced to shut down its entire
records database.18 Between October 2015 and January 2017, an
unauthorized user accessed patient information held by Verity Medical
Foundation.19 The compromised information included the names, birth
dates, medical record numbers, addresses, and credit card numbers of
more than 9,000 individual patients.20 Verity failed to detect the breach
until January 6, 2017.21 On January 3, 2017, Emory Healthcare—an
Atlanta-based hospital system—discovered a compromise of
approximately 80,000 records of patients who used its online

/article/20161101/SPONSORED/161109984/five-tips-you-need-to-easepatient-concerns-in-the-digital-age (last accessed Mar. 8, 2017).
15.

Id. (“Our consumers are hyperaware of the sensitive information included
in their health records.”).

16.

See Akanksha Jayanthi, 16 Latest Healthcare Data Breaches, Security
Incidents, HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.beckers
hospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/16-latest-health
care-data-breaches-security-incidents.html (reporting sixteen healthcare
data breaches or incidents occurring within a single four-week period).

17.

Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals are the Perfect Targets for Ransomware,
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016), available at: https://www.wired.com/2016/03/
ransomware-why-hospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/.

18.

John Woodrow Cox, Karen Turner & Matt Zapotosky, Virus infects
MedStar Health system’s computers, forcing an online shutdown,
WASH.POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/virus-infects-medstar-health-systems-computers-hospital-officials-say/
2016/03/28/480f7d66-f515-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html.

19.

Verity Health System Notifies Patients of Data Incident, BUSINESS WIRE
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201702060058
55/en.

20.

Id.

21.

Id.
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appointment system.22 As illustrated here, by a mere handful of breach
examples, the cybersecurity of many healthcare providers is inadequate.
These attacks continue to happen despite the number of requirements
healthcare providers must meet to protect the sensitive information of
their patients. Federal regulation regarding the protection of patient
privacy is rooted in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its subsequent regulations.23
In particular, the Security Rule implemented by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in accordance with
HIPAA governs the safeguards healthcare providers and other covered
entities must establish for the protection of electronic patient data.24
While the Security Rule promulgates many safeguards for the
protection of patient data, it still falls short in light of new cyberthreats, such as ransomware. Data breaches continue to happen, and
they continue to happen on a gigantic scale.
In sum, current federal data breach security regulation fails to
adequately protect patient data. In light of recently developing threats
to electronic personal health data, HIPAA’s Security Rule should be
modified to provide more stringent protections, while maintaining the
flexibility and scalability promulgated by HIPAA.
Part II of this Note provides background on data breach security
under HIPAA. In particular, it describes the federal regulations for the
protection of electronic health data and explains ransomware and the
threat it poses to data security. Part III of this Note highlights the
inadequacies of federal data breach regulations and proposes modifications
that address these inadequacies both generally and concerning
ransomware more specifically. Finally, Part IV discusses recent actions
by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and how its enforcement
actions provide an impetus for healthcare organizations to carry out
data security modifications.

II. Background
A.

HIPAA & Risk

HIPAA is in large part about risk. Risk is “used colloquially to
suggest that an action or decision may lead to a negative outcome.”25
22.

Rachel Arndt, Emory Healthcare Cyberattack Affects 80,000 Patient
Records, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.modern
healthcare.com/article/20170302/NEWS/170309983/emory-healthcarecyberattack-affects-80000-patient-records.

23.

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. (2016).

24.

See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2016).

25.

Kristin N. Johnson, Managing Cyber Risks, 50 GA. L. REV. 547, 556 (2016)
(citing GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK
MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 535 (2014)).

369

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the
Future of Health Care Privacy Protection

More accurately, however, risk simply means uncertainty.26 The cause
of this uncertainty may stem from a variety of factors, including human
error, flaws in the organizational system, technical system failures, or a
multitude of external factors.27 In respect to only the uncertain negative
outcomes, risk management can be characterized as the avoidance or
limiting of these negative risks.
The following visualization of structural risk illustrates the
relationship between risk factors and potential negative outcomes:

Figure 1.28

Z1, Z2, Z3, . . . Z7 represent several kinds of unfavorable events. Y1
is an undesired outcome. Event Y1 will occur if at least one of any of
the events in the set Z1, . . . ,Z7 occur. Assuming any event in
Z1, . . . ,Z7 either will, or will not, occur, any person or organization
wanting to eliminate the occurrence of Y1 will want to in some way
limit the set of events leading to that outcome.29 Take, for example, a
ship carrying bottles of wine from a vineyard in France to a wine
distributor in the United States. The undesired outcome of this voyage
is the wine not making it safely to the wine distributor in the U.S. A
series of events may lead to the wine not making it stateside: the wine
bottles may be damaged, the cargo may be lost at sea, the ship may
strike a leak and sink, or the ship may be commandeered by pirates.
The seller-vineyard—in order to avoid this undesired outcome—would
enforce certain requirements on his carrier to limit the set of events
that would lead to it: properly storing and fastening the cargo of wine

26.

Id. (“Risk simply describes an element of uncertainty or the chance for a
range of possible outcomes.”).

27.

Ekaterina Karaseva, Ability of Logical and Probabilistic Model for Operational Risk Management, 11 RELIABILITY: THEORY & APPLICATION 23,
23 (Sept. 2016).

28.

See id. at 24 for the original model (“Structural model of operational risk
for first business line.”).

29.

Id. at 25 (discussing the model and explaining the relationship between
outcome Y and the Z-set of events).
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bottles, ensuring any holes in the ship are sealed to not let in water,
and avoiding routes known for pirate attacks.30
Similarly, HIPAA imposes many requirements on healthcare
providers to avoid the undesired outcome of unauthorized access of
patients’ personal health information. Like the carrier of the wine,
healthcare providers carry the precious information of their patients.
And, like the seller-vineyard, HIPAA is deeply concerned with how that
“cargo” is handled. There are a lot of requirements promulgated under
HIPAA.31 These requirements aim to address vulnerabilities that are
commonly exploited and cause an undesired outcome.32 While the
requirements under HIPAA address a wide variety of risk factors, the
section that specifically provides for the protection of electronic health
information is known as the Security Rule.33
B.

HIPAA’s Security Rule

Regulations promulgated by HHS under HIPAA are commonly
referred to as the Privacy and Security Rules.34 HIPAA was amended
in 2009 by the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act (HITECH)35 and updated in January 2013 with
HHS’s publication of the Omnibus Final Rule.36 While the Privacy Rule
protects all “individually identifiable health information,”37 the Security
Rule protects only electronic protected health information (ePHI) and
is therefore the basis for federal data breach security regulation.38

30.

The facts of this hypothetical are inspired by the facts of RheinbergKellerei GMBH v. Vineyard Wine Co., 281 S.E. 2d 425 (1981) in which a
large shipment of wine lost at sea resulted not only in a contract dispute,
but a sea full of drunken fish.

31.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2006).

32.

HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html (last updated on June
16, 2017) (“To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care
system . . . [HIPAA] required HHS to adopt national standards for
electronic health care transactions . . . ”).

33.

45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2016).

34.

See 45 C.F.R. §§160, 162, 164 (2016).

35.

42 U.S.C. §17935 (2016).

36.

See General Administration Requirements, 45 C.F.R. §160 (2016) and
Security and Privacy, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2016).

37.

See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2016).

38.

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1) (2016).
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ePHI is electronically stored, personally identifiable health information
collected from an individual.39 These data are stored in health information
systems (HIS) around the globe “in hospitals, research centers, and
diagnostic laboratories.”40 The Security Rule divides the risks that
threaten to exploit the vulnerabilities of HISs into three categories:
physical, administrative, and technical.41 These risks would form the set
Z1, . . . ,Z7 in Figure 1 above.42 For example, if ePHI were stored on a
single computer, a physical risk would be the probability of someone
burglarizing the computer and the data on it.43 The Security Rule
establishes three categories of safeguards—physical, administrative, and
technical44—which all work together to limit the probability of the
vulnerabilities in HISs being exploited.45
Each security standard includes a variety of implementation
specifications, which are designated as either “required” or “addressable.”46
Although healthcare organizations must adhere to the Security Rule’s
standards, they are not bound to observe every single implementation
specification described within the standards.47 Healthcare providers
must implement the implementation specifications labeled as
“required.” Meanwhile, implementation specifications labeled as
“addressable” provide healthcare organizations with some discretion.
39.

See Integrating Privacy & Security Into Your Practice, HEALTH
IT,https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-privacysecurity/practice-integration (last updated Apr. 13, 2015).

40.

Shahidul Islam Khan, Abu Sayed & Latiful Hoque, Digital Health Data:
A Comprehensive Review of Privacy and Security Risks and Some
Recommendations, 24 COMPUTER SCI. J. OF MALDOVA 273, 274 (2016).

41.

See 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2016); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164, subparts A and C
(2016) and The Security Rule, HHS.GOV https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/security/index.html (last updated May 12, 2007).

42.

See Karaseva, supra note 27, at 24 (Figure 1 above).

43.

See, e.g., 45 C.F.R § 164.310(a)(1) (2016) (Physical safeguards, which
protect against physical risks, include facility access control, which implies
“policies and procedures to limit physical access to its electronic
information systems.”).

44.

See Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule ,U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulat
ions/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERV.].

45.

See id.

46.

For Professionals: FAQ, What is the Difference Between Addressable and
Required Implementation Specifications in the Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-profession
als/faq/2020/what-is-the-difference-between-addressable-and-requiredimplementation-specifications/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013).

47.

See id.
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“Addressable” does not mean “optional.”48 Rather, a healthcare
provider may assess whether the implementation specification is
reasonable, and if not, then it is permitted to implement a more
appropriate alternative measure than the “addressable” specification.49
The Handbook for HIPAA-HITECH Security published by the
American Medical Association describes “addressable” specifications as
“situational.”50
1.

Physical Safeguards

Physical safeguards are requirements related to “buildings and
equipment”51 and the risks posed by “natural and environmental
causes,” and unauthorized intrusion from unsanctioned human physical
access.52 A crucial note here is that “data back up and storage” is
labeled as “addressable.”53 Under this implementation specification,
healthcare organizations should “create a retrievable, exact copy of
electronic protected health information, when needed, before movement
of equipment.”54 The “addressable” provisions also include facility
security planning and access control and validation, both of which are
promulgated with very broad regulatory language.55
2.

Administrative Safeguards

Administrative safeguards are the “nontechnical measures that an
organization’s management establishes regarding acceptable employee
conduct, personnel procedures, and correct technology usage within the
enterprise.”56 The most important standard required under the
administrative safeguards is the security management process.57
Organizations should assess potential risks to their data security and
48.

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 44.

49.

45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d) (2016). See also 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)
(2016) (explaining that execution of the Security Rule is driven in large
part by the risk analysis and management instituted in the administrative
safeguards.).

50.

MARGARET AMATAYAKUL, HANDBOOK FOR HIPAA-HITECH SECURITY 84
(2d ed. 2013) (“You must address these specifications, but you may do so
according to your own situation.”).

51.

45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2016) (defining “physical safeguards”).

52.

Id.; see also Mike Jerbic & Stephen Wu, The Security Rule, in A GUIDE
TO HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW 62 (Stephen S. Wu, ed., 2007).

53.

45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2)(iv) (2016).

54.

Id.

55.

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2016).

56.

Jerbic & Wu, supra note 52, at 27-28; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2017)
(defining “administrative safeguards”).

57.

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(i) (2016).
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“implement security measures sufficient to reduce risks and
vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level.”58 Two addressable
implementation specifications under this section are “access
authorization” and “access establishment & modification.”59 Under
these provisions, a healthcare provider is encouraged to have in place
policies that establish and limit the level of access to data within its
HIS.60 Also addressable are the specifications under the category
Security Awareness and Training.61 This means that healthcare
providers have a lot of discretion on how they run as a top-to-bottom
organization, including who within the organization has access to what
within the organization’s HISs.62 Despite employee negligence being
noted as a major contributing factor to data security problems,63
healthcare organizations are given this broad discretion on the
authorization-related safeguards under HIPAA.
3.

Technical Safeguards

Technical safeguards are flexible requirements for the operations of
HISs that “store, process, or transmit ePHI.”64 Addressable safeguards
in this section include the specification that healthcare organizations
should “implement a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt electronic
protected health information.”65 This provision does not provide any
other information, including differentiating between data-at-rest and
data-in-motion, or a minimum level of encryption.66 In other words, the
technical safeguards mandated by HIPAA do not distinguish when data
58.

45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2007).

59.

45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B)–(C) (2007).

60.

Id.

61.

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(i)–(a)(5)(ii)(D) (2007).

62.

See, e.g., HIPAA Security Series: Part 2, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., 9 (March 2007), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/
privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/adminsafeguards.pdf.

63.

See Ponemon Institute, Third Annual Benchmark Study on Patient
Privacy & Data Security, 9 (2012) (the study found “insider negligence”
one of the central factors in a significant portion of data breaches); see
also Lucy L. Thomson, Health Care Data Breaches and Information
Security, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO
HEALTH CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 255 (Arthur
Peabody, Jr., ed., 2013) (“Responses . . . attributed [rise in data breaches]
to a lack of technologies, resources, and trained personnel.”).

64.

See Jerbic & Wu, supra note 52, at 76; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2017)
(defining “technical safeguards” as “the technology and the policy and
procedures for its use that protect electronic health information and
control access to it.”).

65.

45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) (2007).

66.

Id.
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are “moving” across a network—be it private or public—and when they
are stored in some form (or “at rest”).67 Encryption is mentioned again
in § 312(e)(2)(ii).68 Data should be encrypted whenever the healthcare
organization “deem[s] [it] appropriate.”69 Across the board, the required
minimum level of technical safeguards in place to protect HISs and
ePHI from cyber-threats are far too lax. This has inevitably led threats
such as ransomware to wreak havoc on the healthcare industry.
C.

Ransomware

1.

Encryption

Ransomware employs encryption to prey on unsuspecting persons.
Encryption is “the transformation of data into a form unreadable by
anyone without a secret decryption key.”70 The purpose of encryption
is privacy: even someone with access to the encrypted data (“ciphertext”)
is unable to discern the data in readable form (“plaintext”).71 There are
two types of encryption, or cryptography: symmetric key cryptography
and public key cryptography.72 In symmetric key cryptography, the
sender and receiver use the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt the
data.73 Public key cryptography uses a pair of keys: a public and a
private key.74 The public key is shared between both parties, while both
sender and receiver have a unique private key.75 The public key is used
to encrypt the data, but can only be decrypted back into plaintext with
the corresponding private key. For example: A, B, and C want to
encrypt the messages they send amongst each other. A, B, and C’s
public keys are openly known. A and C can encrypt a message with the
B-public-key. Only B, however, can decrypt and read the message using
B’s secret, private key.
67.

See Regulation and Standards: Where Encryption Applies, SANS INST., 2
(Nov. 2007), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst
/regulations-standards-encryption-applies-34675 (“Data in transit is
commonly delineated into two primary categories—data that is moving
across public or ‘untrusted’ networks, such as the Internet, and data that
is moving within the confines of private networks.”).

68.

45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2007).

69.

Id.

70.

Encryption FAQ, STAN. UNIV., https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/
cs181/projects/1995-96/clipper-chip/encyptfaq.html (last accessed Mar.
10, 2017).

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.

Id. (Author uses the term “secret key cryptography,” but the concepts are
synonymous.).

74.

Id.

75.

Id.
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Ransomware uses hybrid encryption, combining the two
cryptographies to create an asymmetrical cryptosystem.76 In this
cryptosystem, the public key cryptosystem is used for key encapsulation
and a symmetric key is used for data encapsulation.77 Data is encrypted
using a randomly-generated symmetric key.78 This symmetric key is
subsequently encrypted using a public key where one party has the
corresponding private key.79 The party with the private key decrypts
the symmetric key using the private key.80 The recovered symmetric
key can then be used to decrypt the data back into plaintext.
2.

Ransomware Attacks

Figure 2.81

Ransomware is malware that carries out a cryptoviral extortion
attack, in which the data of a target computer or information system
is virtually “held hostage” until a ransom is paid. It is one of the fastest
growing cybersecurity threats and has recently become a terror to
healthcare providers.82 The worst part about the torrent of ransomware

76.

See Jonathan Katz, Lecture 4, Advanced Topics in Cryptography, UNIV.
MD., 4-1 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at: https://www.cs.umd.edu/~jkatz/
gradcrypto2/NOTES/lecture4.pdf.

77.

See id.

78.

See id.

79.

Id. (“A hybrid encryption scheme uses public-key encryption to encrypt
a random symmetric key, and then proceeds to encrypt the message with
that symmetric key.”).

80.

See id.

81.

Krzysztof Cabaj & Wojciech Mazurczyk, Using Software-Defined Networking
for Ransomware Mitigation: The Case of Cryptowall, 30 IEEE NETWORK
14, 15 (Nov. 2016). (Figure used in authors’ explanation of ransomware
(“Symmetric (left) and asymmetric (right) crypto ransom-ware”). The
asymmetric model is more commonly used today to extort victims.).

82.

See Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals are the Perfect Targets for Ransomware,
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ransomwarewhy-hospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/.
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attacks: there does not seem to be a sufficient answer to this threat.83
In fact, the Assistant Special Agent in charge of the FBI’s Boston Cyber
& Counterintelligence office has noted that “[t]he ransomware is that
good.”84 In 2015, the FBI stated it may be easiest for victims of
ransomware attacks to “just pay the ransom,” as efforts to solve the
data-encrypting algorithms after a breach occurred were essentially
useless.85 So, how exactly does ransomware work?
Ransomware functions by “[p]reying on human error.”86 Cybercriminals who employ ransomware typically infect victims through some
form of social engineering that lures unsuspecting victims into
unknowingly opening their system to malware.87 The cybercriminals
behind ransomware—often disguising their malware as something far
less malicious—lure victims into activating the program,88 which then
hijacks and encrypts the victim’s system.89 Methods include phishing,
spam, drive-by-download, or any method that disguises a malware’s
payload as a legitimate file. One example is a lawyer receiving a
polished and well-crafted e-mail inquiring about employment at his
firm. The e-mail included an attached resume in the form of a Microsoft
Word document, which activated the ransomware when the lawyer
clicked to open it.90 Ransomware may also spread on its own by using
gaps in a computer system to access and encrypt the data without any
interaction on the part of the victim.91

83.

Paul, FBI’s Advice on Ransomware? Just Pay the Ransom., THE SEC.
LEDGER (October 22, 2015), https://securityledger.com/2015/10/fbisadvice-on-cryptolocker-just-pay-the-ransom/.

84.

Id. (emphasis added).

85.

Id.

86.

Mohamad Ali, Is Your Company Ready for a Ransomware Attack?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/is-your-com
pany-ready-for-a-ransomware-attack.

87.

Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81.

88.

There are multiple brands of ransomware; ransomware simply refers to
the species of cyber-threat. See Ondrej Krahel, Ransomware—A Sneaky,
Dangerous Cyber Threat, CSO (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.csoonline.
com/article/3170196/security/ransomware-is-a-sneaky-dangerous-cyberthreat.html.

89.

Ali, supra note 86.

90.

Steve Strauss, Why Your Small Business Needs to Care About
Ransomware, FIGHT RANSOMWARE, https://fightransomware.com/
ransomware-articles/small-business-needs-concerned-ransomware/ (last
visited Oct. 22, 2017).

91.

See Ali,supra note 86; see also Cammy Harblson, New Ransomware
Installers Can Infect Computers Without Users Clicking Anything, Say
Researchers, DIGITAL TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.idigitaltimes
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Once a victim’s device or system has been infiltrated by the
cybercriminal’s malware, the malware encrypts the victim’s data using
a randomly-generated symmetric key.92 This locks the system, including
personal cloud storage services.93 The malware uses a public key to
encrypt the symmetric key, creating an asymmetric cryptosystem.94 A
victim’s computer then displays a ransom message, demanding some fee
to gain access to data. The victim pays the ransom, and sends the fee
along with the encrypted symmetric key.95 The cybercriminal uses a
private key to decrypt the symmetric key and sends the key back to
the victim, who can then use it to re-gain access to their system.96
3.

The Current State of Data Security in Healthcare

The United States is the country most widely impacted by
ransomware attacks.97 As of 2013, data breaches in healthcare
accounted for 45 percent of all data security breaches.98 In 2016 alone,
healthcare data breaches comprised 35 percent of all breaches, a figure
that the business sector has only recently eclipsed.99 In 2016, 44 perecnt
of healthcare organizations participating in a Ponemon Institute Study
reported that ransomware was their greatest cyber-related concern.100
.com/new-ransomware-installers-can-infect-computers-without-usersclicking-anything-say-522756.
92.

Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81.

93.

Ali, supra note 86.

94.

Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81.

95.

See Kevin Savage, et al., The Evolution of Ransomware, SYMANTEC
SECURITY RESPONSE, 22–23 (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.symantec.com/
content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/theevolution-of-ransomware.pdf (The payments usually go through several
proxies and is made in the hard-to-trace currency bitcoin.).

96.

Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81.

97.

Savage et al., supra note 95, at 34 (making up 54% of all binary-based
ransomware attacks among the world’s twelve wealthiest countries).

98.

Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from Identity
Theft Resource Center and CyberScout, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Jan.
19, 2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html.

99.

Id. Although this is somewhat of an anomaly in recent years, even with
the business industry having high profile data breach cases such as Target
and Home Depot. See Kevin McCoy, Target to Pay $18.5M for 2013 Data
Breach that Affected 41 Million Consumers, USA Today (May 23, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/23/target-pay-185m2013-data-breach-affected-consumers/102063932/; see also Jeff John
Roberts, Home Depot to Pay Banks $25 Million in Data Breach
Settlement, Fortune (Mar. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/
home-depot-data-breach-banks/.

100. Ponemon Institute, Sixth Annual Benchmark Study on Privacy & Security
of Healthcare Data, 13 (May 2016). Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were
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Documents containing the most damaging and sensitive patient
information—medical files and billing and insurance records—were
most likely to be successfully targeted by cybercriminals.101 Of the
surveyed healthcare organizations, 64percent reported compromised
medical files, and 45 percent reported breached billing and insurance
records.102 This rate represented an increase from previous years.
Healthcare organizations have always been particularly vulnerable, and
security has never been more important.
Dangers to healthcare data security come from two sources: the
data security software design and the persons who “manipulate the
[health IT] systems.”103 A study conducted by the Pennsylvania Patient
Safety Authority that examined electronic health record-related
incidents between 2004 and 2012 concluded that “[t]he majority of
EHR-related reports involved [human error].”104 Human error, in
particular, is a major factor in healthcare-related breaches.
According to HHS, between 2009 and 2013, the top causes of data
breaches affecting 500 or more individuals were: improper disposal
(5%), hacking/IT incident (6%), loss (11%), unauthorized access (20%),
and theft (54%).105 In 2015, breaches affecting 500 or more individuals
totaled 253, with a loss of 112 million personal healthcare records.106
Also, in 2015 “hacking/IT incident” and “unauthorized access”
reported by 48% of covered entities as their greatest concern. DoS attacks
have been used by cybercriminals in conjunction with ransomware
breaches. See, e.g., Ricci Dipshan, Danger Ahead: 3 New Ransomware
Developments in 2016, LAW TECH. NEWS (May 31, 2016), http://www.
legaltechnews.com/id=1202758839457/Danger-Ahead-3-New-Ransom
ware-Developments-in-2016-?slreturn=20170827111230.
101. Ponemon Institute, supra note 100, at 21.
102. Id.
103. See Arthur E. Peabody Jr., Safety Risks Associated with EHRs: How
Real?, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH
CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 243-44 (2013).
104. Erin Sparnon & William M. Marella, The Role of the Electronic Heath
Record in Patient Safety Events, 9 Penn. Patient Safety Adv., 113, 113121 (Dec. 2012), http://patientsafety.pa.gov/ADVISORIES/documents
/201212_113.pdf; see also Peabody, supra note 103.
105. MARGRET AMATAYAKUL, HANDBOOK FOR HIPAA-HITECH SECURITY 1112 (2d ed. 2013) (analyzing the data from U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., OCR, Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals (last visited Oct.
29, 2016), https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf.
106. See Dan Munro, Data Breaches in Healthcare Totaled Over 112 Million
Records in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-healthcare-total-over-112million-records-in-2015/#1b03d7137fd5; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERV., OCR, Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, supra
note 105.
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composed a majority of the larger security breaches.107 2016 saw a 320
percent increase in breaches affecting 500 or more individuals caused
by hacking/IT incidents.108 Therefore, while technology-driven breaches
caused a significant portion of the attacks, almost all breaches were
caused in some way by to human error.109 This indicates changes in
mandated administrative practices may result in better data security.
The level of compliance with security measures across the healthcare
industry is anything but perfect. Between April 2003 and December
2017, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of HHS investigated 37,023
complaints of HIPAA violations.110 Of those investigations, 25,637
resulted in corrective action, while the remainder found “no violation.”111
That means the OCR found that violations existed in over 68 percent
of the investigated complaints.112 While 37,023 is a drop in the bucket
compared to the number of total healthcare organizations in the United
States, the percentage of investigated organizations who were not in
compliance is startling. The synchrony of heightened threats of
ransomware and other data security attacks with the lack of compliance
in the healthcare industry results in a huge potential for devastating
consequences when data breaches do in fact occur.
In particular, ransomware shapes a large swath of the current data
security landscape. In 2016 alone, ransomware attacks accumulated
approximately $1 billion in ransom payments worldwide.113 The general
perception across the healthcare industry is that ransomware attacks
will increase throughout 2017.114 So far, this feeling has turned out to
be true. In May 2017, the world saw the “biggest ransomware attack in

107. See Munro, supra note 106; see also Understanding the Depth of the Global
Ransomware Problem, MALWAREBYTES, 10 (Aug. 2016), https://www.
malwarebytes.com/surveys/ransomware/?aliId=13242065. (The percent
distribution was different, and the category of hacking/IT incident was
split into several categories, including “e-mail phishing” and “ransomware.”).
108. REDSPIN, Breach Report 2016: Protect Health Information (PHI),
CYNERGISTEK 5 (Fed. 2017), https://www.redspin.com/resources/
download/breach-report-2016-protected-health-information-phi/
[hereinafter REDSPIN].
109. Id. at 17.
110. See Numbers at a Glance, Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERV.https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
compliance-enforcement/data/numbers-glance/index.html (last updated
July 31, 2017).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. REDSPIN, supra note 108, at 10.
114. Id.

380

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the
Future of Health Care Privacy Protection

history.”115 Although the attack was widespread from Spain to Japan,
it hit England particularly hard, where is sent the National Health
Service (NHS) into flight or fight response.116 Hospitals and other
healthcare organizations across London and northern England were
forced to “revert to pen and paper” in many instances.117 Some
organizations even had their staff using personal mobile devices in the
place of encrypted systems.118 Now, more than ever, ransomware is a
threat and necessitates action on the regulatory level.
4.

The Cost of Ransomware and Other Cyber-threats

Healthcare organizations are potential cash cows for cybercriminals.
Across the healthcare industry in 2015 alone, the cost of data breaches
was $363 per record.119 This is compared to $154 per record cost across
all other industries.120 Indeed, the price of not protecting the data on
HISs is steep. Over a two-year period, economic losses to healthcare
organizations from data security breaches ranged from less than $10,000
to well over $1 million.121 The price of data breaches has only been on
the rise. More recently, the cost of data breaches to healthcare
organizations has increased to $380 per record.122 Because of the
increasing value of data, the costs of data breaches are expected to

115. See Henry Bodkin, et al., Government Under Pressure After NHS
Crippled in Global Cyber Attacks as Weekend of Chaos Looms, THE
TELEGRAPH (May 13, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/
05/12/nhs-hit-major-cyber-attack-hackers-demanding-ransom/.
116. See Lily Hay Newman, The Ransomware Meltdown Experts Warned
About is Here, WIRED (May 12, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/
ransomware-meltdown-experts-warned/.
117. Chris Graham, NHS Cyber Attack: Everything You Need to Know About
‘Biggest Ransomware’ Offensive in History, THE TELEGRAPH (May 20,
2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/13/nhs-cyber-attackeverything-need-know-biggest-ransomware-offensive/.
118. Id.
119. Although this is somewhat of an anomaly in recent years, even with the
business industry having high profile data breach cases such as Target
and Home Depot, see Khan, supra note 40, at 277 (citing the 2015
Ponemon Institute Study on the Cost of Data Breach Comprehensive
Study). This number was derived from the total costs of data breaches
over the number of records compromised.
120. Id.
121. See Ponemon Institute, supra note 63, at 1.
122. Elizabeth Snell, Healthcare Data Breach Costs Highest for 7th Straight
Year, HEALTH IT SECURITY: PATIENT PRIVACY NEWS (June 20, 2017),
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/healthcare-data-breach-costs-highestfor-7th-straight-year.
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quadruple by 2019 to an estimated net cost of $2 trillion.123 The costs
for healthcare organizations goes beyond the dollar value of the EHRs
compromised by cyber-attacks.124 There are also indirect costs attached
to every breach, including the use of organizational resources and the
loss of goodwill.125
Patients suffer the most when healthcare organizations fail to
adequately protect the sensitive information stored on their HISs. While
patients often suffer some form of economic damage as a result of a
data breach,126 the greater—and often harder to measure—harm is from
having their privacy violated.127 Patients place their faith and trust in
their healthcare providers. When this trust is broken or thrown into
doubt because unauthorized individuals have accessed sensitive health
information, it may be difficult to re-build. The non-monetary damage
inflicted upon patients by data breaches is far more significant than the
dollar value paid by healthcare organizations. Because of this, healthcare
providers should work to their fullest extent to protect the data of their
patients.
D.

The Problem of Outsourcing

One problem that complicates the process of implementing
safeguards to eliminate the risk of data security breaches is outsourcing.
Outsourcing has been a staple across the information technology sector
since the 1990s.128 More recently, however, the healthcare industry has
shifted larger portions of its resources abroad through outsourcing
initiatives.129 Doug Brown, the Managing Partner of the Black Book
123. See Dante Disparte & Daniel Wagner, Do You Know What Your Company’s
Data is Worth?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/
09/do-you-know-what-your-companys-data-is-worth.
124. See Khan, supra note 40, at 277.
125. Id.
126. For example, from unauthorized access to personal data, such as payment
information (i.e. social security numbers, credit card numbers, etc.). In
this regard, patients in healthcare data breaches suffer the same harm as
consumers in large business data breaches. See Cord Blood Bank Settles
FTC Charges that it Failed to Protect Consumers Sensitive Personal
Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2013/01/cord-blood-bank-settles-ftc-chargesit-failed-protect-consumers.
127. Privacy being a fundamental right. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (holding that a penumbra of privacy is created by “several
fundamental constitutional guarantees”).
128. Kritika Bharadwaj, How Safe is this Shore?—Data Protection and BPOs
in India, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 539, 557 (2010).
129. See Black Book Market Research, IT Outsourcing Booms in Healthcare
Payer Sector as Insurers Go High Tech, PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/it-outsourcing-booms-in-
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Research Group, noted: “[H]ealth insurance niche software and service
vendors are once again offering outsourcing as a cure-all for
organizational cost controls.”130 Business process outsourcing companies
(BPOs) are mostly a self-regulated industry.131 While the HIPAA
regulations offer no bright-line rule on offshoring, HIPAA is clear on
the rules regarding business associates.132 A business associate is a
person or entity that “performs certain functions or activities that
involve the use or disclosure of protected health information on behalf
of, or provides services to, a covered entity.”133 But how does a
healthcare provider ensure that offshore business associates are
adequately protecting the ePHI of their patients?

III. Recommendations
Healthcare data security is clearly lacking. Despite the strides made
by HIPAA thus far, it is far from perfect. This Part offers three primary
modifications to HIPAA that would better protect patient ePHI stored
on HISs while remaining scalable and flexible for the broad spectrum of
healthcare organizations. This Part also briefly addresses the issues
posed by outsourcing healthcare IT. Section III.A of this Note proposes
mandating stricter technical safeguards for the protection of patient
data. Section III.B offers a clearer and simplified guideline for
compliance that incorporates industry best practices. Section III.C
provides a framework that categorizes risks, which healthcare
organizations would use to analyze the extent of the security measures
they should reasonably use to maintain the flexibility that is central to
HIPAA.
A.

Mandate Stricter Technical Requirements

The technical safeguards provided by HIPAA are broad and fail to
provide a clear guideline of what technical protections would be
sufficient and what, at a minimum, should be required.134 Encryption,
healthcare-payer-sector-as-insurers-go-high-tech-new-black-book-survey300182354.html (finding that many health plans are budgeting at least
20% increases in outsourcing spends).
130. Id.
131. Bharadwaj, supra note 128, at 560.
132. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e) (2007) (disclosures to business associates); see
also 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2007) (requirements for business associate
contracts).
133. Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. https://www.hhs
.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/
index.html (last updated Apr. 3, 2003).
134. See45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2007) (listing all technical safeguards promulgated under the Security Rule).
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for example, should be used whenever a healthcare organization deems
it “appropriate.”135 The Security Rule mandates that healthcare organizations “[i]mplement technical security measures to guard against
unauthorized access to electronic protected health information that is
being transmitted over an electronic communications network.”136 Not
only is this extremely broad with little explanation, but it also only
focuses on ePHI “being transmitted over an electronic communications
network.”137 HIPAA does not mention electronic data storage
standards.138 A handful of specific, stricter technical safeguards would
better protect patient data.
1.

Require a 3-2-1 Rule for Data Backup

First, the Security Rule should be modified to better protect data
through more efficient and stringent storage and backup requirements.
Ideally, data backup plans should accomplish three things: (1)
periodically and consistently backup data; (2) take special care
regarding where the backup data is stored; and (3) avoid relying solely
on online backup.139 Requiring healthcare organizations to implement a
3-2-1 Rule for storing all ePHI would be ideal for achieving these
objectives.140 A 3-2-1 Rule is defined as a healthcare organization having
“three copies of data, on two different types of media, with one of those
copies being off site.”141 One of the types of media healthcare organizations
should use must be external and offline. In addition to implementing a
3-2-1 Rule, healthcare organizations should be required to perform
continuous data backup and recovery tests.142 This would ensure that
all copies of ePHI are up-to-date and that healthcare providers can be
confident in their recovery systems.143 HIPAA’s Security Rule would
benefit from requiring this data storage behavior in all healthcare
organizations.

135. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2007).
136. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(1) (2007).
137. Id.
138. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2007).
139. Marion K. Jenkins, The Top 5 Benefits of the HIPAA Security Rule,
PHYSICIANS PRACTICE (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.physicianspractice
.com/healthcare-careers/top-5-benefits-hipaa-security-rule.
140. See Dipshan, supra note 100.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See id.
143. This will also important for already required provisions under the Security
Rule’s technical safeguards. For example, when a healthcare provider
must access ePHI for an emergency under 160.312(a)(2)(ii) (2016).
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This specific modification does not protect healthcare organizations
by preventing ransomware attacks and other cybersecurity risks. What
this data storage and backup behavior does is mitigate any damage to
the healthcare provider caused by these types of attacks. Ransomware
uses denial of access to important data as leverage to extort healthcare
organizations.144 Often times, the data held hostage is important to the
healthcare provider’s function in aiding its patients. For example, the
data may include patient medical history and charts. Without it,
doctors may not be able to adequately provide service to a patient.
Following a ransomware attack, if healthcare organizations are able to
address the cybercriminal’s access point to their HIS, and then access
the data that was held hostage, then they would no longer be pressured
to pay the ransom. Healthcare organizations could instead take time to
further analyze the situation and how to address the problem. If the
organization properly addresses the access point the criminal used to
encrypt the ePHI, then it may be assumed that the criminals no longer
have access to the data. The healthcare organization would still, however,
have to bear some cost in properly destroying the copy of the data that
was encrypted by the cybercriminal if they cannot decrypt it without
paying the ransom.145
2.

Encryption

At a minimum, all healthcare organizations should be required to
implement some level of encryption for highly sensitive ePHI. A simple
symmetric key encryption should be used by all healthcare providers
for all ePHI. Of course, if after performing the security management
process, a healthcare organization discerns that its HIS contains a large
store of patient ePHI, it may decide to use a public key encryption
system or a hybrid encryption.146 This would be more likely for larger
healthcare systems, as opposed to smaller practices.147 In conjunction

144. Kim Zetter, What is Ransomware? A Guide to the Global Cyberattack’s
Scary Method, THE WIRE (May 14, 2017), https://www.wired.com/
2017/05/hacker-lexicon-guide-ransomware-scary-hack-thats-rise/
(“Ransomware is malware that locks your keyboard or computer to
prevent you from accessing your data until you pay a ransom . . . ”).
145. This may, or may not, be cheaper than the ransom demanded by the
cybercriminal. That estimation would be on a case-by-case basis. Not
paying the ransom, however, has the benefit of deterring the behavior of
cybercriminals by not rewarding the criminal activity. See Ransomware:
Should You Pay the Ransom?, EY ADVISORY (2016), https://advisory
.ey.com/cybersecurity/should-you-pay-the-ransom.
146. See Katz, supra note 76, at 4-1.
147. Simply because larger healthcare systems, on the whole, have more
resources and therefore a more sophisticated technology infrastructure.
See Olin Bay, Health Care Information Technology: A Key to Quality and
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with requiring encryption, the physical safeguards should be modified
to mandate strict control of who within a healthcare organization has
access to the key(s).148 Only those that absolutely require access to
patient ePHI should have access to the key(s). This may also be helpful
when sending ePHI within a network from one organization member to
another through the use of a public key encryption system. Finally, one
thing all healthcare organizations should be required to do is to
occasionally re-encrypt ePHI.149 Each healthcare organization may
analyze their needs and the risks involved to decide how frequently this
is done, but creating new key pairs should be done at least every five
years.
Encryption comes with several potential challenges. What if a
malicious employee with access to a key is terminated? Must a healthcare
organization pay for revoking the key and ciphertext to re-encrypt the
ePHI? What about cloud storage—where data is stored in logical pools
as opposed to on physical devices—which is increasingly used in the
healthcare industry?150 Access control is a major issue, both inside and
outside the growing field of cloud data storage.151 One developing solution
is self-updatable encryption, in which the ciphertext and a private key
are directly correlated to a period of time.152 A person within an
organization may then be able to decipher data only within the time limit

Cost Issues, LEAGUE WOMEN’S VOTERS (2010), http://www.montrose
.co.lwvnet.org/files/hcet_bp_healthcareinfotech.pdf.
148. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2007) (physical safeguards control
personnel access to facilities and workstations, an addition can be made
that functions very similarly for decryption keys).
149. This is fairly easy to do. Take, for example, re-encryption and key rotation
for Google’s Cloud KMS. See, e.g., Key rotation, GOOGLE CLOUD
PLATFORM, https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/key-rotation (last updated
June 26, 2017) (showing re-encryption and key rotation for Google’s Cloud
KMS). See also Re-encrypting Data, GOOGLE CLOUD PLATFORM,
https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/re-encrypt-data (explaining that
the process for re-encrypting data is fairly straightforward and involves
decrypting the data, using a new primary key to re-encrypt the data, and
then disposing of the prior used key).
150. See Iron Mountain, Cloud Data Storage: Why Healthcare Organizations
are Taking Notice, IRON MOUNTAIN KNOWLEDGE CTR., http://www.
ironmountain.com/Knowledge-Center/Reference-Library/View-byDocument-Type/General-Articles/C/Cloud-Data-Storage-WhyHealthcare-Organizations-Are-Taking-Notice.aspx (last accessed Mar. 4,
2017) (“Nearly one-third [73%] of healthcare decision makers said they
are using cloud applications”).
151. See Kwangsu Lee, et al., Self-updatable Encryption: Time Constrained
Access Control with Hidden Attributes and Better Efficiency, 667
THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE 51, 52 (2017).
152. Id. at 52
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that their key works.153 This type of encryption system may also provide
cloud data servers with a comforting level of access control and
security.154
Encryption, much like mandating a 3-2-1 Rule, does not directly
prevent ransomware attacks. It primarily protects patients by making
any ePHI a cybercriminal may access indecipherable, and thus
incapable of being used to harm patients. Unlike the 3-2-1 Rule,
encryption and its strategic use may limit the risk of cybersecurity
breaches by limiting the flaws in the protections of HISs. An encrypted
HIS is less likely to fall victim to non-technical methods of penetration,
such as breaches resulting from human error or deviance.155 Encryption
may also deter cybercriminals across the board, as the data has little
value if it is in indecipherable ciphertext.156
3.

Data-at-rest v. Data-in-motion

HIPAA should provide differentiated requirements for data-at-rest
and data-in-motion. Data-at-rest means data that is stored in some
static form.157 For example, the data in file systems and databases are
data-at-rest.158 Data-in-motion means data “as it moves through the
network to the outside world.”159 Data that is in transit via e-mail,
messaging software, peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, or any similar
mechanisms are examples of data-in-motion.160 To adequately protect
sensitive data, data-at-rest must be treated differently from data-inmotion.161 The safeguards this Note proposes for data-at-rest generally
involves software protections and cyber hygiene. On the other hand,
data-in-motion requires a level of authentication. Both types of data
should be encrypted.

153. Id. at 57.
154. Id. at 51.
155. See Robert Lemos, Use Data Encryption to Safeguard your Data, PC
WORLD (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.pcworld.com/article/153826/data_
encryption_tools.html.
156. Id.
157. See Simon Liu & Rick Kuhn, Data Loss Prevention, 12 IT PROFESSIONAL
10, 11 11 (2010), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/documents/dataloss.pdf.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id.
161. Id. (“Data in each state often requires different techniques for loss
prevention. For example, although deep content inspection is useful for
data in motion, it doesn’t help so much for data at rest.”).
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HIPAA should require a minimum level of organizational cyber
hygiene and resilience.162 HIPAA should explicitly require that
organizations implement endpoint security protections, intrusionprevention software, and web browser protection for all devices with
accessibility to both an HIS and the internet. Further, it should require
that all healthcare organizations update their software. The period of
time between software updates should be, at a minimum, weekly,
though healthcare organizations may determine this need on a case-bycase basis. HIPAA should also be modified to require penetration
testing. This means that an IT security company evaluates the security
of an organization’s security infrastructure.163 These tests highlight
vulnerabilities not only in protective software, but in system
configuration and end-user behavior.164 The frequency and extent of
these penetration tests would depend on the size and capabilities of the
healthcare organization.165 Organizations would determine this after
performing their own risk assessments.
Healthcare organizations should also take measures to secure ePHI
that is in motion, either across a HIS or that is travelling to an external
location. While the most effective method of protection is encryption,
there are other steps that healthcare organizations could and should
take. HIPAA should mandate that healthcare organizations implement
technical policies and procedures for both data-in-motion and data-atrest. As an addressable implementation specification, HIPAA should
require that healthcare organizations use both authentication and a
virtual private network (VPN). Authentication would ensure that all
data being sent and received is either going to or coming from a trusted
source.166 This would prevent many of the tactics cybercriminals use to
infiltrate HISs and begin ransomware schemes.167 All ePHI sent from a
162. The concept of cyber hygiene refers to the responsibility of individuals to
maintain the “health” of the user’s system. It is centered on routine and
contributes on a organizational level to cybersecurity. See Floyd
McKinney, Fight Security Decay; Cyber Hygiene, ENGILITY (Sept. 17
2017), https://www.engilitycorp.com/blog/article/fight-security-decaypractice-good-cyber-hygiene.
163. See What is Penetration Testing?, CORE SECURITY, https://www.core
security.com/penetration-testing-overview (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
164. Id.
165. Frequently Asked Questions, HALOCK SECURITY LABS, https://www.hal
ock.com/frequently-asked-questions-pages-357.php (last visited Oct. 23,
2017).
166. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, If You Want a VPN to Protect Your Privacy,
Start Here, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/
03/want-use-vpn-protect-privacy-start/
167. Because VPNs secure peer-to-peer networks, this method would limit
phishing e-mails that appear to come from an internal source (and thus
more likely to be opened by the victim). 7 Steps to Protect Yourself
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secured network environment should only be received through the use
of a VPN because a VPN creates “a secure connection even on a public
unsecured network.”168 This is a particularly important option for
mobile devices used to access or transmit ePHI.169 Requiring healthcare
organizations to implement or consider implementing some form of
these measures would protect patient ePHI from ransomware and other
cybersecurity attacks.
4.

Prohibit Use of Generic Usernames

The Security Rule’s technical safeguards require healthcare
organizations to “[a]ssign a unique name and/or number for identifying
and tracking user identity.”170 This, unfortunately, is not enough. This
provision should be modified to explicitly prohibit the use of generic
passwords for any device or workstation operated by a healthcare
organization. Also, there should either be a prohibition against
commonly shared work stations, or at the very least strict controls
regarding these workstations. The Recommended HIPAA Security
Standards developed by the University of South Florida’s (USF)
HIPAA Security Team, for example, provides a more stringent version
of the Unique User Identification Standard.171
USF’s recommended standard prohibits both generic usernames
and passwords. Furthermore, their recommended standard explicitly
sets a minimum quality requirement for passwords.172 Under their recommended standard: “Passwords are to consist of at least six characters, and
should include alpha, numeric, and special characters in order to prevent
unauthorized password use or password guessing.”173 This standard, or
something similar to it, should be required to prevent blunt force breach
attempts. USF’s standard, unlike the one currently promulgated by
HIPAA, also addresses common work stations.174 Where multiple users
Against Corporate Spear Phishing, LINOMA SOFTWARE (June 28, 2017),
https://www.goanywhere.com/blog/2017/06/28/7-steps-to-protectyourself-against-corporate-spear-phishing.
168. See Use Adequate Security to Send or Receive Health Information Over
Public Wi-fi Networks, HEALTH IT, https://www.healthit.gov/providersprofessionals/10-use-adequate-security-send-or-receive-healthinformation-over-public-wi-f (last updated Mar. 21, 2014).
169. Id.
170. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(i) (2007).
171. See HIPAA Security Rule Safeguards Recommended Standards, UNIV. S.
FL. (May 12, 2005), http://health.usf.edu/nr/rdonlyres/2d58eb73-e08a4ede-b3bf-2ef77a4ad70c/0/usfhipaasecurityrulestandards.pdf.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id.
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are required to have access to one workstation, USF still requires
stringent access to the individual applications on the workstation.175
USF’s recommended standards for user identification are a great
example of what HIPAA should require of all healthcare organizations.
Heightened access standards like these should be paired with personnel
limitations on access to certain parts of HISs to generally protect
against negligently introducing malware and cybersecurity attacks,
including ransomware.
5.

Require Access-Triggered Breach Notification

Under HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rules, healthcare providers are
required to notify individuals “whose [ePHI] has been, or is reasonably
believed . . . to have been accessed, acquired, used, or disclosed as a
result of such breach.”176 This seems sufficient on its face. Unfortunately,
under the same rule, unauthorized access is not a breach if a healthcare
provider determines “that there is a low probability that the protected
health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment.”177
The factors of the risk assessment include “whether the [ePHI] was
actually acquired or viewed.”178 As a result, cybersecurity breaches such
as ransomware attacks, where the data is encrypted, would not trigger
notification to individuals. Therefore, despite the organization’s HIS
being penetrated and the data being “accessed” by an unauthorized
person, patients are left in the dark about whether their ePHI is
involved or not.
HIPAA’s data breach notification should be revised to replace the
“risk assessment” with an automatic access-based trigger. This means
that notification would be triggered “whenever personal data is
reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person
and require no evidence that an unauthorized person actually acquired
the data.”179 A ransomware attack and similar breaches should then
satisfy this requirement. Transparency is important and therefore
whenever there is a reasonable belief of unauthorized access, patients
should be kept informed of potential risks involving their sensitive
personal information.
An argument against such a modification is that patients would be
overwhelmed with notifications and de-sensitized to the notices that
175. See id.
176. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(1) (2016).
177. 45 C.F.R. § 164.402(2) (2016).
178. Id.
179. Stanley C. Ball, Note, Ohio’s “Aggressive” Attack on Medical Identity
Theft, 24 J.L & HEALTH 111, 138 (2011) (The student-author in this Note
focuses on state law in the context of medical identity theft, the definition
used is nevertheless helpful here.).
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healthcare organizations send out.180 This is problematic if patients are
unable to decipher when a breach is particularly important (i.e. when
their personal data has actually been acquired and the risk of medical
or financial identity theft is realistic). First, if data stored in HISs are
properly encrypted, then that eliminates the need to not provide notice
at all. This is because breaches under HIPAA only involve unsecured
ePHI.181 Through the use of encryption, the data are rendered unusable,
unreadable, and indecipherable.182 Second, to further address this issue,
the type of notice provided should be based on a factor-based risk
analysis. Currently, HIPAA requires written notice for individual
notification.183 Without actual proof of access or acquisition of data, the
form of notice should be online and easily accessible to patients.
Patients should, however, be occasionally reminded of the existence of
these postings. For breaches where individuals’ data are acquired by
unauthorized persons, written notice should be provided as it is
currently laid out in the federal regulations.184
B.

Provide Clearer & Simplified Compliance Guidelines

In their 2007 article, Professors Sharona Hoffman and Andy
Podgurski argue in part that one of the flaws of HIPAA’s Security Rule
is that, in providing covered entities with flexibility and discretion, the
Rule fails to provide adequate guidance on how the covered entities
should comply with the requirements.185 The authors also contend that
“some organizations could use the regulations’ vagueness as a
justification for establishing minimal PHI security measures.”186 Finally,
180. See Experts Forecast Top Seven Trends in Healtcare Information Privacy
for 2011, IDEXPERTS (Jan. 05, 2011), https://www2.idexpertscorp
.com/knowledge-center//single/experts-forecast-top-seven-trends-inhealthcare-information-privacy-fo . Or this leaves patients simply terrified
all the time. See Asha Saxena, 6 Ways Hospitals Can Ease Patients Fears
About Security Threats, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REVIEW (May 26,
2015), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-informationtechnology/6-ways-hospitals-can-ease-patients-fears-about-securitythreats.html.
181. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(1) (2016) (“A covered entity shall, following the
discovery of a breach of unsecured protected health information . . . ”)
(emphasis added).
182. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2016) (defining “unsecured protected health
information”).
183. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(d)(1) (2016).
184. See, e.g., id.
185. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and
Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health
Information, 48 BOS.C. L. REV. 331, 350-51 (2007).
186. Id. at 351.
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they point out that the Security Rule does not require that healthcare
organizations rely on the “best current security practices” of the data
security community.187 One of the “reputable organizations” that the
authors recognize as a potential basis for “best practices” in complying
with HIPAA Security is the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).188
HHS should officially adopt NIST’s data security standards as best
practice for the entire healthcare industry. NIST and HHS already have
a long history of working closely together, so promoting NIST in the
federal regulations would not be a sweeping change.189 Healthcare
organizations should be required to perform their risk assessments in
light of the standards promoted and drafted by NIST. For example,
healthcare organizations should refer to the NIST risk management
framework (RMF).190 The RMF provides a “disciplined, structured,
extensible, and repeatable process for achieving risk-based protection
related to the operation and use of information systems.”191 All
healthcare organizations should follow and apply the RMF when
complying with the Security Rule.

187. Id. at 252–3.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Addressing Gaps in Cybersecurity: OCR Releases Crosswalk
Between HIPAA Security Rule and NIST Cybersecurity Framework, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/security/nist-security-hipaa-crosswalk/index.html?language
=es (last updated Feb. 23, 2006). The “crosswalk” identifies points of
interaction between the Security Rule and NIST Framework, as well as
other widely known security frameworks.
190. See NATL’ INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
SP 800-66 REV. 1, AN INTRODUCTORY RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
(HIPAA) SECURITY RULE, 10 (Oct. 2008), available at: https://www.hhs
.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/n
ist80066.pdf [hereinafter Scholl].
191. Id.; see also Figure 3.
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192

Figure 3.193

As NIST has pointed out, the RMF overlaps with the
implementation standards promulgated under the Security Rule. The
six steps distill much of the spirit of the Security Rule into an easy to
follow process. In conjunction with the six-step RMF, NIST has also
provided questions to help guide compliance with the Security Rule’s
three general safeguards.194 Providing an explicitly adopted best
practice standard for complying with the Security Rule helps
ensure that healthcare organizations implement sufficient measures to
protect against cybersecurity threats, including ransomware.
C.

A Flexible Administrative Standard

One of HIPAA’s policy goals was to provide healthcare organizations
with flexibility and discretion in applying it’s mandates.195 A smalltown private practice with a single physician, for example, would not
apply the same level of security measures as a national hospital
network. Along with using NIST as an understandable basis for
complying with HIPAA, the flexibility standard should be revised so
that healthcare organizations may retain flexibility but do not have
too much discretion as to apply minimal standards in some cases.
192. Scholl, supra note 190, at 11 (“Many Security Rule standards and
implementation specifications correspond to the steps of the NIST RMF.”).
193. Id. at 11. (showing a visual portrayal of the NIST Risk Management
Framework.).
194. See id. at17–53.
195. See 45 C.F.R.§ 164.306(b) (2016) (flexibility of approach).
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There are many registers of information technology security
threats.196 HHS should develop and maintain a similar database that
documents cyber-threats to e-PHI and HISs, borrowing from already
existing registers while contributing healthcare-specific threats. These
threats should be categorized into three risk groups: known, semiknown, and unknown.197 Known threats are those that are clearly
known and can easily be addressed through implementing clearly
defined technical safeguards.198 These threats include malware that has
been identified, is widely known, and up-to-date endpoint protection
software would adequately protect against.
Semi-known threats are threats that “the cybersecurity industry
has already identified [many of the risks for and] . . . best practices for
addressing them.”199 Unlike known threats, there is no clear solution to
semi-known threats and best practices to address related risks are not
commonly implemented throughout the industry. These threats include
ransomware. For example, there is no common solution to ransomware
once an organization’s data is encrypted. While broadly accepted
preventative measures are promoted by experts, there is no clear
solution to thwarting ransomware. Also, healthcare organizations must
still calculate the “likelihood and magnitude” of these types of
threats.200 All healthcare organizations should protect themselves
against known threats, and in some way address semi-known threats.
Finally, only healthcare organizations with sizeable HISs and
mature, well-developed security capabilities and culture should in any
way address unknown threats. Unknown threats “represent failures of
imagination.”201 Therefore, only organizations with a developed
technology infrastructure have the luxury, time, and resources for dealing
with this kind of non-immanent threat. The few, capable organizations
should make habitual inquiries into cybersecurity and address potential,
yet-to-be identified threats by foreseeing potential liabilities in their use
196. See, e.g., Security Response Center, SYMANTEC https://www.symantec
.com/security_response/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (Symantec lists and
categorizes every cyber-threat and continually updates this list).
197. See Noah G. Susskind, Note, Cybersecurity Compliance and Risk
Management Strategies: What Directors, Officers, and Managers Need to
Know, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 573 (2015). This tripartite structure was
influenced by a similar idea proffered by the student-author here. Unlike
this Note, however, this author focuses on the financial industry and
corporate governance and management, where I apply a similar idea to
the healthcare industry and HIPAA. The idea of applying this tripartite
to a register of threats is also unique to this Note.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 601.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 618.
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of IT in relation to their HISs. This tripartite structure for flexibility in
administering security safeguards strikes a balance between allowing
healthcare providers to have discretion and more stringently protecting
patient ePHI.
D.

Addressing the Outsourcing Problem

If a large-scale data breach involving ePHI were to happen offshore
where a vendor performs outsourced services, it is unclear what the
ability of HHS would be to enforce HIPAA against the offshore organization. Currently, HIPAA mandates what disclosures a covered entity
may make to business associates (BAs) and what disclosures BAs may
in turn make.202 It does not, however, clearly identify offshore service
providers as BAs. Kirk Nahra, chair of Wiley Rein LLP’s Privacy
Practice, when asked about whether offshore vendors constitute
business associates under HIPAA, had to say, “HIPAA doesn’t say a
word about offshore. But a BA is a BA is a BA.”203 On the bright side,
India’s laws and self-regulation standards are comforting for any person
worried about the security of ePHI handled by offshore vendors located
in the country.204 The India Information Technology Act of 2008,
modified in 2011 by the Information Technology Rules, mandates strict
requirements for the privacy of sensitive data.205 These rules include the
requirement that organizations collecting personal data “must have in
place reasonable security practices and procedures.”206 Indeed, it is
likely that many offshore vendors “with a history of dealing with U.S.
health-care clients—are as good or better than U.S. companies at
protecting data.”207 Still, HIPAA should be further modified to include
vetting criteria for covered healthcare organizations thinking of
outsourcing services overseas.208
202. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e) (2016).
203. Kirk Nahra Discusses HIPAA Compliance Questions Involving Offshore
Vendors, WILEY REIN LLP (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.wileyrein.com/
newsroom-media-992.html [hereinafter Wiley Rein].
204. See Todd B. Ruback & Sarah Mahony, An Overview of Recent Statutory
Changes to Privacy Law in India in Comparison to Similar U.S. and EU
Privacy Rules, 2011 N.J. LAW. 38, 40 (2011).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Wiley Rein, supra note 203 (quoting Kirk Nahra).
208. I leave this proposition with the question. While I do not believe
outsourcing is a major issue for this topic as of now, I do think this
proposal is one worth more thought. For the sake of brevity, however, I
will save it for later discussion. See generally, After OCR Probe of Stolen
Flash Drive, Hospital Is Not Fined; Upgrade Was Under Way, REP. ON
MEDICARE COMPLIANCE (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.kslaw.com/
attachments/000/004/735/original/rmc_feb_27-2.pdf?1499727809.
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IV. The Federal Trade Commission
Even if HIPAA is not modified, the practices proposed in this Note
should be adopted by all healthcare organizations as industry best
practices. Healthcare organizations should adopt these proposals
because inadequately safeguarding patient data despite clear evidence
of cyber-threats across the industry may mean liability for unfair
practices towards their patients. This Part explains the recently
developing history of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement of
data security practices and the FTC’s authority over this subject
matter. In the most recent case of LabMD, the FTC developed a legal
framework for liability that makes many healthcare organizations liable
for poor data security practices, even when no actual harm occurs to
their patients as a result. The FTC’s recent actions afford a strong
impetus for healthcare providers to make these proposed modifications.
A.

FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.

The FTC has played a strong role in enforcing cybersecurity cases
since the early 2000s. On January 31, 2014, the FTC announced the
milestone of its fiftieth data security settlement.209 The FTC further
solidified its position as the authority of the data security field by
releasing its own guidance on the subject.210 The FTC’s enforcement
was challenged and affirmed in the case FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide
Corp..211 There, Wyndham challenged the FTC’s statutory authority to
regulate data security practices after the FTC filed suit against
Wyndham alleging unfair and deceptive practices for data breaches
occurring between 2008 and 2014.212 The district court found for the
FTC, holding that it possessed the requisite authority to enforce data
security claims.213
The data breaches resulted in hackers obtaining payment
information—including credit card numbers and security codes—of over
600,000 consumers, resulting in $10.6 million in fraud loss.214 The
hackers infiltrated property management systems that process

209. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S
50TH DATA SECURITY SETTLEMENT (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf.
210. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (Jan. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
211. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
212. See id. at 241.
213. Id. at 631.
214. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,799 F.3d at 242.
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consumer information that Wyndham managed.215 The FTC alleged
that as far back as 2008, Wyndham managed these systems in a manner
that “taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’
personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”216 This included: (1)
storing payment information in clear, readable text; (2) using “easily
guessed” passwords to secure the management systems; (3) allowing the
management systems to connect to Wyndham’s entire network without
appropriate technical precautions217; (4) failing to “adequately restrict”
the access of third-party vendors to the network; and (5) not following
proper procedure or conducting an investigation following a security
breach.218
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits “[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive practices in or affecting commerce.”219 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that Congress designed the
term “unfair methods of competition” as a flexible concept and left its
development to the FTC.220 The FTC provided guidance on factors
governing unfairness determinations, which the Supreme Court later
adopted:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy . . . whether,
in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some
common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
and
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers.221

215. Id. at 241.
216. Id. at 240.
217. For example, Wyndham allowed at least one hotel to connect to its system
with a security system that had not been updated in three years.
Wyndham also permitted connection with the use of default usernames
and passwords.
218. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,799 F.3d at 240–241.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) (“The
Commission shall have no authority under this section . . . to declare
unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is
unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves.”).
220. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,799 F.3d at 243.
221. Id.
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The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision.222
Wyndham also argued that the FTC’s claim should fail because its
conduct was not unethical or unscrupulous, and because a business
“does not treat its customers in an ‘unfair’ manner when the business
‘itself’ is victimized by criminals.”223 The court rejected both arguments,
holding that unfairness claims may be brought on likely rather than
actual injury.224
B.

In re LabMD

The FTC’s authority in the realm of data security was extended in
the case of LabMD. In July 2016, the FTC heard a case regarding the
negligent handling of sensitive patient information by a medical testing
company.225 LabMD—the company in question—provided management
employees with administrative rights over their workstations (i.e. control
over their workstation’s operating system), including sales employees.226
Around 2005, LabMD’s billing manager and others in the department
accidentally exposed files containing sensitive patient data to a P2P
file-sharing program.227 Later, unauthorized persons accessed a file
containing these sensitive health data, which included names and social
security numbers of 600 patients.228
The FTC overturned an administrative law judge (ALJ)’s ruling
where the ALJ defined the phrase “‘likely to cause [substantial injury]’”
to mean “‘having a high probability of occurring or being true.’”229 The
ALJ also held that the unauthorized exposure of sensitive medical data,
without an accompanying tangible injury, fell outside the scope of
“substantial injury” under the FTC Act.230 Looking to the Wyndham
Worldwide three-part test, the FTC found that LabMD failed to:
protect its computer network with even the most fundamental cyber
hygiene practices; provide data security training to its employees; and
restrict or monitor the computer practices of persons using its
network.231
222. Id. at 259.
223. Id. at 246.
224. Id.
225. See In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., 2016 FTC LEXIS 128 *1 (F.T.C. July
28, 2016)
226. Id. at *4–5.
227. A P2P file-sharing program is one that allows the sharing of media files
through the use of a peer-to-peer network., id. at *5.
228. Id. at *11.
229. Id. at *56.
230. In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., 2016 FTC LEXIS at *19.
231. See id. at*9–10.
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The panel of commissioners of the FTC held that the FTC could
act preemptively and without a showing of tangible harm.232 The FTC
also found that while cases of unfairness usually involve tangible,
economic harm, the FTC Act recognized other forms of harm.233
Therefore, in concluding that LabMD’s security practices were
unreasonable and lacked “even basic precautions,” the FTC held that
actual harm is not necessary for a finding of “unfair” conduct.234
Organizations can be liable if their practices create a risk of harm and
negligent security practices were sufficient to create liability for data
security breaches.235
C.

FTC on the Move

The FTC has recently focused its data security guidance and
enforcement on the threat of ransomware. FTC Chairwoman Edith
Ramirez publicly announced that “[a] company’s unreasonable failure
to patch vulnerabilities known to be exploited by ransomware might
violate the FTC Act.”236 The FTC has also issued guidance on the topic
of ransomware-prevention.237 Within this guidance, the FTC lays out what
it minimally expects of organizations to defend against ransomware attacks:
(1) Implement education and awareness programs to train
employees to exercise caution and avoid phishing schemes;
(2) Practice good security by implementing basic cyber hygiene
principles;
(3) Back up data early and often; and
(4) Develop and test incident response and business continuity
plans.238

232. Id. at *68.
233. Id. at *72.
234. Id. at *1.
235. Id. at *62–63; but see LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816, 822 (11th
Cir. 2016) (circuit court granting stay pending appeal in favor of LabMD
on order requiring LabMD to implement data security compliance measures).
236. See Cara Salvatore, FTC Chair Threatens Action On Ransomware Holes,
LAW360 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/837883/ftcchair-threatens-action-on-ransomware-holes.
237. Ben Rossen, Ransomware: a Closer Look, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Nov. 10,
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/11/
ransomware-closer-look.
238. A lot of these practices that the FTC urges organizations to invest in are
consistent with the technical recommendations offered in this Note, see
id.
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The FTC has also supported the use of standards promulgated by
NIST and the use of NIST’s security framework.239 In fact, the FTC has
concluded that the NIST framework and the FTC’s data security
approach are “fully consistent.”240 Because of the relationship that exists
between HHS and the FTC,241 and the FTC’s stance on and response
to unreasonable data security practices, FTC enforcement may create
a lot of issues for healthcare organizations.
D.

Implications for Healthcare Providers

In light of the FTC’s decision in LabMD and its strong stance on
ransomware protections, healthcare organizations have a strong
impetus to make modifications to their HIS data security. While there
is no private cause of action under HIPAA,242 OCR enforces HIPAA’s
Security Rule.243 This enforcement process involves a complaint, a
subsequent investigation, followed either by a resolution from OCR or
a criminal violation that the DOJ will pursue.244 Now, the FTC may
hold healthcare organizations personally liable for unfair and deceptive
practices towards their patients for poor data security practices.
First, ransomware presents a clear case of risk of harm, as opposed
to actual harm. The fact that an unauthorized person accesses a HIS
makes the substantial harm likely, which is sufficient for FTC action.
Although no tangible economic harm may occur to patients for the
intrusion of ransomware, the access to their ePHI is enough to create
an unfair practice under the FTC Act. Second, because of recent
ransomware attacks, all healthcare organizations are aware of the threat
and how the attacks are typically carried out. Failing to take adequate
preventative measures would be equivalent to Wyndham’s and
LabMD’s negligent practices. Finally, the potential harm caused to
239. See Andrea Arlas, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc.
240. Id. (“The types of things the Framework calls for organizations to evaluate
are the types of things the FTC has been evaluating for years in its Section
5 enforcement to determine whether a company’s data security and its
processes are reasonable.”).
241. See, e.g., Sharing Consumer Health Information?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERV.(Oct. 2016)https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
special-topics/HIPAA-ftc-act.
242. 45 C.F.R. § 160.300-.552 (2016) (covering the enforcement process under
HIPAA); see also FRANCOISE GILBERT, Enforcement, in A GUIDE TO
HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW 101, 107-108 (Stephen S. Wu, ed., 2007).
243. See Enforcement Process, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV.
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/
enforcement-process/index.html (last updated June 7, 2017).
244. Id.
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patients is not reasonably avoidable by patients themselves. Unless
healthcare providers wish to face the same consequences as these
companies, they should take the appropriate steps to protect the data
of their patients from ransomware, as well as other known and emerging
threats. Thus, even if HIPAA is not amended, healthcare organizations
should take action in light of potential FTC enforcement.

V. Conclusion
Sweeping changes to HIPAA’s Security Rule are impracticable and
unnecessary. Specific modifications—as proposed in this Note—would
better carry out HIPAA’s purpose to protect the privacy of patient
ePHI from unauthorized persons. These proposed changes protect the
data from unauthorized access in particular. New threats, such as
ransomware, arise and expose chinks in the armor that HIPAA’s
Security Rule supposedly placed over the body of ePHI, making the
need for these changes increasingly clear. These proposed modifications
would provide a heightened level of security while remaining flexible,
as healthcare organizations all have different needs, capabilities, and
budgets. While these changes would be beneficial, there is no single or
perfect answer to the question of how to protect patient data in this
digital world and digital economy. HIPAA should be modified for the
benefit of patients, whose private and valuable information is held in
trust by healthcare organizations. And even if these modifications are
not adopted, healthcare organizations should act to better protect their
patients’ data.
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